Abstract: This study is aimed at ascertainment of factors influencing adoption and disclosure of voluntary corporate governance practices (VCGP) of Indian listed firms. Results revealed that: a) there exists a large variation in VCGP across Indian firms; b) VCGP of Indian firms are significantly affected by their size, financial leverage, ownership concentration, industry type, the effectiveness of their audit committees, foreign listing status and type of external auditors. Further, this study confirmed: a) the substitution effect of 'Leverage' and 'Ownership Concentration' on adoption and disclosures of VCGP; b) the presence of interaction (interplay) between 'Leverage' and 'Ownership Concentration'. While firms with high and moderately diversified shareholding pattern depict substitution effect of leverage on adoption of VCGP, firms with highly concentrated shareholding pattern depict substitution effect of ownership concentration on adoption of VCGP.
Introduction
The concept of corporate governance (CG) is ever evolving. Its scope has broadened over a period of time due to the increasing complexities of business organisations, economic liberalisation and several high profile corporate financial scandals (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 ; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999 , 2004 , 2014 . Therefore, prescribed CG norms applicable to firms in countries all over the world are being continuously revised and their compliance by firms is subject to more serious scrutiny by the regulators.
In India, Clause 49 of listing agreement between Indian stock exchanges and listed firms specifies mandatory CG practices and recommendatory best CG practices. Sharma (2012) examined CG practices of 50 Indian S&P CNX NIFTY Index firms and found that
• a majority of those firms adhered to the mandatory CG practices even while ignoring the recommendatory CG practices
• a select few of those firms not only complied with the mandatory and recommendatory CG practices, but went overboard to adopt exemplary CG practices which exceeded the requirements of Clause 49.
Thus, wide variations exist across Indian firms with respect to their extent of adoption of 'recommendatory and exemplary' (hereafter, jointly referred to as 'voluntary') CG practices. While researchers have proposed numerous theories to explain firms' decision to adopt and disclose voluntary CG practices, yet very few studies have empirically examined those theories mainly due to non-availability of published data on firms' voluntary CG practices until the1990s. In most developed and emerging countries, comprehensive disclosures on CG practices of firms within their annual reports were made mandatory only during the 1990s or later. The authors, in their literature review, came across only limited empirical studies which have examined the determinants of listed firms' decisions to adopt and disclose voluntary CG practices.
These studies have unfolded numerous determinants of firms' decision to adopt and disclose voluntary CG practices but as yet relatively few stylised facts have emerged. Some of the existing studies have rather reported contradictory findings. None of these studies is comprehensive as each of them individually has focused only on a limited number of determinants. Further, most existing studies have relied on ordinary least square (OLS) regression models to arrive at determinants owing to limited CG disclosures by firms till a better part of the last decade. However, this study has used the multinomial cumulative logit (MCL) regression and the Poisson regression models due to increased richness of CG disclosures in the recent years. These models are more appropriate than OLS regression models given the count nature of the dependent variable (CG disclosure practices) of this study.
Moreover, studies conducted with a sample of Indian listed firms have a narrow focus on measuring only the extent of adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices. The existing indices for measurement of adoption and disclosure of CG practices of Indian listed firms are dated and have composite focus on voluntary as well as mandatory CG practices (Sarkar et al., 2012; Balasubramanian et al., 2008; Gupta et al., 2003; Sharma, 2012; Bhasin, 2012) . The existing studies have not focused on determinants of adoption and disclosure voluntary CG practices of listed Indian firms. Therefore, available empirical studies do not provide clear insights into determinants of adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices of Indian listed firms. The research questions of this study are:
• Whether wide variations still persist in adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices of Indian listed firms?
• What are the determinants of adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices of Indian listed firms?
2 Review of empirical literature
Studies to measure the extent of adoption and disclosures of CG practices
Numerous studies have been conducted wherein researchers have used CG disclosures/ practices indices to measure the adoption and disclosures of CG practices of their sample firms. 1 While some researchers have constructed their own CG disclosures indices, others have either adapted or directly used available CG disclosures indices of existing studies. The existing studies have been conducted both with the sample of firms drawn from developed as well as emerging countries (Holder-Webb et al., 2008 for the USA; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003 for Australia; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2008 for the UK; Sharma, 2012; Sarkar et al., 2012; Chakrabarti et al., 2008 for India; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012 for Saudi Arabia). Overall, findings of these studies are:
Sarbanes-Oxley type measures in form of Clause 49 of the listing agreement signed between stock exchanges and listing firms. Gupta et al. (2003) studied disclosed CG practices of 30 select Indian listed firms in their annual reports for 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 using content analysis. They found a large variation in disclosed CG practices of their sample firms, even to the extent of non-compliance to the mandatory requirements of Clause 49 by some firms. Their results could be attributable to the fact that provisions of CG in form of Clause 49 were mandated from the year 2000 onwards. Balasubramanian et al. (2008) constructed their own 49-itemed CG disclosures Index based on a survey of the 370 Indian firms listed on BSE-500 Index and identified areas where Indian CG regulations:
• were relatively strong and weak
• could be relaxed or strengthened. Sarkar et al. (2012) used a self-constructed CG disclosures index to study the temporal evolution in disclosed CG practices of BSE-500 Index firms over six years period (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . Their CG disclosures index captured four aspects of corporate governance viz., the board of directors, the ownership structure, the audit committee, and the external auditor. They observed a significant positive change in disclosed CG practices of their sample firms during 2008 and interpreted this as a response of Indian firms to the high profile CG fiasco of Satyam.
The existing CG indices for Indian listed firms and approaches used for measurement of adoption and disclosures of CG practices in literature suffer from following deficiencies:
• The existing CG indices for measurement of disclosed CG practices of the Indian listed firms in the literature are dated and have a composite focus on voluntary as well as mandatory CG practices (Gupta et al., 2003; Balasubramanian et al., 2008; Sharma and Singh, 2009; Sharma, 2012; Sarkar et al., 2012; Bhasin, 2012) . Thus, there is a scope for construction of a contemporary and comprehensive index designed exclusively to measure the adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices of the Indian listed firms.
• All but one study have used dichotomous scale (1 or 0) for measurement of disclosed CG practices of their sample firms which result in ignorance of quality aspect of disclosed CG practices.
Authors came across only one study which has applied multiple rating scales rather than using dichotomous scale (1 or 0) for measurement of disclosed voluntary CG practices of its sample firms (Holder-Webb et al., 2008) . However, due to the richness of CG disclosures in the recent years, an appropriately designed and applied multiple rating scale approach to capture the quality aspect of disclosed voluntary CG practices could potentially be a more useful approach.
Studies conducted to find determinants of adoption and disclosures of CG practices
Starting with the pioneering study of Cerf (1961) , numerous research studies have been conducted to investigate the determinants of various kinds of voluntary disclosures and/or overall voluntary disclosures of firms. The most consistently identified determinants of overall voluntary disclosures of firms in the literature are: size of company, type of industry, level of multinationality or internationality, profitability, ownership concentration, age, business complexity, financial leverage level, and audit size or quality (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Core, 2001; Lundholm and Winkle, 2006; Beyer et al., 2010; Hassan and Marston, 2010) . While there is a large strand of literature on determinants of various kinds of voluntary disclosures and/or overall voluntary disclosures of firms, yet very few studies have specifically investigated the determinants of adoption and disclosures of voluntary CG practices of firms mainly due to non-availability of documented data on firms' voluntary CG practices through the public sources until during the 1990s.
Authors came across just 12 significant research studies which have specifically investigated the determinants of adoption and disclosures of CG practices of firms (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Anand et al., 2006; Holder-Webb et al., 2008; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2008; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Mohamad and Sulong, 2010; Rouf, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012; Waweru, 2014; Lokman et al., 2014) . 2 A review of above existing studies pointed to their following deficiencies:
• While these studies have unfolded numerous determinants of firms' decision to adopt and disclose voluntary CG practices, yet relatively few stylised facts have emerged. Some of the existing studies have rather reported contradictory findings. For example, while some studies (Holder-Webb et al., 2008; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2008; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Mohamad and Sulong, 2010; Rouf, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012; Lokman et al., 2014) found that firm size has positive impact on its CG disclosures, other studies reported insignificant impact of firm size on its CG disclosures. Similar, contradictory findings have been reported for other determinants.
• None of these individual studies has been comprehensive as each of them has focused only on a limited number of determinants. For example, two of the most comprehensive existing studies (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Samaha et al., 2012) have just considered eight determinants. All other studies have considered still lesser numbers of determinants.
• Most existing studies have relied on OLS regression models to arrive at determinants owing to limited CG disclosures by firms till a better part of the last decade. However, this study has used the MCL regression and the Poisson regression models due to increased richness of CG disclosures in the recent years. These models are more appropriate than OLS regression models given the count nature of the dependent variable (CG disclosure practices) of this study.
• While there is a burgeoning literature on aggregate voluntary disclosures, comprehensive studies on some of the voluntary sub-disclosure categories (viz., corporate social responsibility disclosures, corporate governance practices disclosures, financial disclosures, strategic disclosures and human resource disclosures etc.) are limited. Labelle (2002) asserts that determinants of firm's aggregate voluntary disclosures may be different from the determinants of firm's voluntary CG practices disclosures. Further, firms' motivation and level of adoption of voluntary corporate governance practices (VCGP) depends upon comprehensiveness of its mandatory requirements and strength of the legal protection provided to its investors (Durnev and Kim, 2005) . Authors did not come across any existing studies which have specifically investigated the determinants of adoption and disclosure voluntary CG practices of listed Indian firms. Therefore, this study explored answers to following research questions:
Theoretical framework and hypothesis development
Researchers have promulgated various theories to explain firms' decision to adopt and disclose their CG practices such as agency theory, enlightened stakeholder theory, resource dependence theory, capital market transactions theory, and signalling theory. This section develops hypotheses based on above theories.
Agency theory: Agency theory is based on the premise that there is an inherent conflict of interests between principal and agent in any agency relationship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) . In the context of business organisations, finance researchers have documented three main principal-agency conflicts viz., firm's owners vs. its managers; minority vs. controlling (majority) shareholders; and lenders vs. equity shareholders. The above three principal-agency conflicts arise on account of information asymmetries prevalent between principal and agents. Therefore, firms adopt and disclose additional voluntary CG practices to reduce their above principal-agency conflicts. Agency theory suggests various firm-level determinants of adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices. First, the firms which are larger in size carry out a greater number of contracts which are more complex than smaller ones. Hence, agency issues present a bigger challenge to larger firms than the small-sized firms (Meek et al., 1995) . Therefore, larger firms are expected to adopt and disclose more voluntary CG practices than the smaller firms. Second, the firms with a higher proportion of debt in their capital structure face more agency issues as the default risk for these firms increase (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) . Such firms have to additionally satisfy the information needs of their short-term and long-term lenders/creditors (García-Meca et al., 2005) . Hence, financial leverage of a firm is expected to have a positive impact on its adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003) . Third, investors find it difficult to analyse and monitor firms which have a large quantum of intangible assets. Therefore, such firms tend to adopt and disclose voluntary CG practices so as to minimise agency issues and information asymmetries prevalent between their equity shareholders and managers (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Anand et al., 2006) . Fourth, firms with ownership concentration/block shareholding tend to have lower managerial agency issues as in such firms top management positions are mostly held/controlled by the owners. Therefore, firms with ownership concentration/block shareholding need not adopt and disclose other voluntary CG practices (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Durnev and Kim, 2005) . Last, the firms which are listed on multiple stock exchanges need to cater to the information needs of larger and more diverse shareholders. Agency issues associated with such firms are higher as compared to the firms which are only listed on domestic stock exchanges due to a higher level of geographical dispersion of ownership. Keeping in view the above points of the agency theory, it is conjectured that the size, financial leverage, intangibility of assets, ownership concentration and listing status of firms might influence their adoption and disclosures of voluntary CG practices. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that agency theory links firms' level of disclosures to their CG mechanisms. Subsequent researchers have empirically validated that CG mechanisms followed by firms exert a significant impact on the level of their disclosures (Rouf, 2011; Nandi and Ghosh, 2013) . To reduce their agency issues, firms incorporate a variety of CG mechanisms aimed at:
• strengthening of their internal controls
• reduction of managerial opportunism (Leftwich et al., 1981; Welker, 1995) • reduction of information asymmetries by forcing managers to disclose more information (Apostolou and Nanopoulos, 2009 ).
Frequently used corporate governance mechanisms referred in the extant literature to enhance the disclosure level of firms are: board independence (Black et al., 2006) , hiring high-quality reputable external independent auditor(s) (Fan and Wong, 2005) and effectiveness of audit committee (Rouf, 2011; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012 Enlightened stakeholder theory: Jensen (2001) proposed enlightened stakeholder theory in which he argued that it is practically impossible for a firm to consider the interests of all its stakeholders. Therefore, expectations of only those stakeholders are met who have a higher degree of control over firm's resources and deserves management's attention (Deegan, 2002; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004) . Firms tend to prioritise meeting the demands of their economic goals over social goals as former directly impact their continued viability (Ullmann, 1985 (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) . Such resource requirements, amongst others, may include information (Baysinger and Zardkoohi, 1986) , funds (Burt, 1983; Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988) , linkages to key suppliers (Banerji and Sambharya, 1996) , customers (Frooman, 1999) and other significant stakeholders (Freeman and Evan, 1990 ).
An organisation's board is an important conduit between the organisation and its external environment (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Korac-Kakabadse et al., 2001) . Its ability to provide required external resources depends a lot upon:
• its size and composition (Pfeffer, 1973; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998; Dalton et al., 1999) • interlocks of its directors 3 (Boyd, 1990) .
In summary, as per the resource dependence theory, board level CG practices can enable an organisation to acquire required external resources from its external environment. Firms' dependency on external resources varies with their industry and age. Firms in highly regulated industries tend to be more affected by regulatory changes than firms in unregulated/deregulated industries. Diversified firms tend to be less affected by external shocks as they can take advantage of their diversified presence. Younger firms tend to be more dependent on the external environment for their funding and other linkages like with key suppliers and customers. Therefore, it is conjectured that the industry and age of firms might influence their adoption and disclosures of voluntary CG practices.
Capital market transactions theory: As per this theory, firms have incentives to make voluntary disclosures in order to reduce information asymmetry and therefore reduce the cost of external financing through reduced information risk (Healy and Palepu, 2001) . It is empirically validated that the firms with greater investment opportunities and/or need for external financing, 4 especially in the countries with weaker regulatory regimes, tend to adopt and disclose additional voluntary CG practices so as to alleviate the concerns of and be credible to investors (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Anand et al., 2006) . Therefore, it is conjectured that the firms with greater investment opportunities and/or need for external financing the industry tend to adopt and disclose more voluntary CG practices.
Signalling theory: A firm decision to adopt and disclose voluntary CG practices can be explained from the perspective of signalling theory. As per the signalling theory, firms make voluntary disclosures in order to:
• reduce information asymmetries about them
• distinguish themselves from others by sending positive signals about them.
In the same vein, one can argue that firms tend to adopt and disclose voluntary CG practices to reduce information asymmetries and to send a positive signal about them. Firms which are highly profitable can send a positive signal about the quality of their earnings to investors by adopting and disclosing more voluntary CG practices. By doing so highly profitable firms are able to:
• avoid adverse selection problem (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) • gain investors' confidence in them (Singhvi and Desai, 1971) ; and prevent undervaluation of their shares (Inchausti, 1997) .
Hence, it is conjectured that the firms with greater profitability tend to adopt and disclose more voluntary CG practices.
Based on above theoretical background, Table 1 summarises hypothesised relationship of various firm-level independent variables with voluntary CG practices scores (dependent variable). 
Data sources and sample
The sample for this study is 160 non-financial firms which were part of the BSE-200 Index as on 27 February, 2013. All financial sector firms were excluded keeping in view that unique CG practices and disclosures are mandated for the financial sector firms. Data for the voluntary CG practices of the sample firms was content analysed from their 2011-2012 annual reports which were downloaded in pdf format from the INSIGHT database. Data regarding the proxies of various financial, general and governance indicators of the firms is taken from the CMIE's PROWESS database.
Methodology
A two-step methodology was followed. First, a VCGP index is constructed and used for measuring of VCGP score of each of the sample firms (Subsection 5.1). Next, determinants of adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices of sample firms are ascertained (Subsection 5.2).
Methodology for construction of VCGP index and measurement of VCGP scores
A four-step content analysis procedure was followed to construct the VCGP index and measure the extent of VCGP scores of sample firms and same is described herein below:
Step 1: A VCGP index was constructed through the following procedure:
a Formulated initial VCGP index by reviewing CG practices indices available from the existing studies (Beattie et al., 2004; Yuen et al., 2009; Cheung et al., 2010; Rouf, 2011) and the relevant Indian regulatory requirements related to CG practices disclosures (viz., clause 49 of listing agreement of companies with Indian stock exchanges). All such CG requirements which were to be mandatorily practised and disclosed under Clause 49 were not included in the initial index even though they were part of the existing indices. Further, the items of the recommendatory provision under clause 49 were added.
b The initial VCGP index was further refined through following steps:
i The sample size considered for this study is 160 non-financial sector Indian listed firms of BSE 200 index. Due to time constraints, it was not feasible to go through 160 annual reports to arrive at the final VCGP index. Therefore, it was decided that the voluntary CG practices within one most voluminous annual report from each of the sectors would be thoroughly read to further refine the initial VCGP index. Hence, 19 annual reports which were most voluminous in their respective sectors were read and the index was refined. At this stage, it was realised that voluntary CG practices for some more firms are to be read thoroughly as a reading of voluntary CG practices of every new company continued to bring material refinement in the index. Hence, wherever feasible sector-wise, second most voluminous annual report was read and the index was further refined.
ii Thereafter, a third iteration was initiated. However, it was not resulting in any incremental refinement in the index. Further, all such items which none of the sample firms was practising were removed from the index and the process was stopped. Thus, a total of 40 annual reports were thoroughly read to arrive at final VCGP index with 55 items (sub-codes) categorised under six major codes.
Step 2: Next, it was felt that for certain items of VCGP index, there may be a large variation in intensity/quality of disclosed voluntary CG practices across sample firms. Hence, suitable rating criteria were developed for all such items where a large variation in intensity/quality of disclosed voluntary CG practices was observed by application of following procedure:
For every item in VCGP index, text segments from all the initial 40 annual reports were retrieved and analysed to understand the nature of variation in the disclosure of every VCGP index item. Appropriate rating criteria were developed for each item/subcode corresponding to the intensity of its disclosure in the firms' annual reports with the help of above analysis and the review of existing literature. Under each sub-code different categories were created which correspond to different ratings or intensity of its disclosure in the annual reports. Memos were also developed to explain the criteria of ratings under each sub-code. These memos helped in achieving of the high reliability of disclosure index and scoring procedure.
Step 3: In this step, VCGP scores (with and without ratings) for each of the 160 sample firms were obtained through content analysis of CG disclosures provided in their annual reports. First, VCGP scores with rating were obtained by using the appropriate rating scales of each of the sub-codes. Next, VCGP Scores without ratings were also obtained wherein the intensity of all sub-codes was ignored and a dichotomous system of scoring was followed in which a score of '1' is assigned if a sub-code item was disclosed by the sample firm and '0' if otherwise.
Step 4: Finally, the reliability of disclosure index and the scoring procedure were assessed by using inter-coder and test-retest techniques (Silverman, 2013; Hassan and Marston, 2010) .
Methodology for determinants of adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices
To investigate the determinants of adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices of Indian listed firms, univariate and multivariate analyses were done chronologically.
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First, univariate analyses were carried out whereby by descriptive statistics of all variables were calculated to understand the properties of the independent and dependent variables so as to decide on the suitable multivariate analyses to be conducted.
Next, suitable multivariate regression models were specified and estimated to understand determinants of adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices of Indian listed firms. In these regression analyses, 'VCGP scores' of sample firms were taken as dependent variables and firm characteristics were taken as independent variables. The value of the dependent variable (VCGP scores) for a sample firm is calculated by summing up of scores/ratings obtained by the firm in individual sub-code items of VCGP index. Hence, it could only take positive integral values within a restricted range. Thus, dependent variable in the current multivariate analysis was clearly a discrete (non-normal) variable and could rather be viewed either as a polytomous response variable with an ordered structure or a count variable. Cameron and Trivedi (2013) asserted that when the dependent variable does not meet the normality assumption, application of usual OLS regression analysis could produce erroneous results. In such situations, the use of alternate regressions models is suggested viz., MCL regression model can be used whenever a dependent variable is a polytomous response variable and Poisson regression model can be used whenever a dependent variable is a count variable (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013; McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975) . Accordingly, following two models were specified and estimated rather than the usual OLS regression model. The two model specifications estimated were: In above models 'i' represents individual firms of our sample of 160 firms. Thus, it takes a value of 1 to 160. The detailed definitions and proxies used for measurement of all variables used in above models are included in Table 2 .
The expanded form of variable abbreviations used in above models is as follows:
'VCGP Score i ' is the VCGP score of a sample firm Size represents size of a sample firm Leverage represents financial leverage of a sample firm Intang_of_Assets represents intangibility of assets of a sample firm List_Status represents foreign listing status of a sample firm Board_Ind represents level of board independence of a sample firm Own_Conc represents Ownership Concentration of a sample firm Auditor_Type represents the auditor type of a sample firm Aud_Com_Effectiveness represents effectiveness of audit committee of a sample firm Profitability represents profitability of a sample firm Industry represents industry of a sample firm and is a categorical variable represented by ∑I Age represents age of a sample firm Inv_Opp represents total investment opportunities available to a sample firm NEF represents the need for external financing of a sample firm. Aud_Com_Effectiveness It represents effectiveness of audit committee. Empirical literature on CG suggests that effectiveness of audit committee of a firm is driven by proportion as well as number of independent directors in it (Samaha et al., 2012) . While very little variation was observed in proportion of independent directors in audit committees of our sample firms (majority of firms' audit committee had 100% independent directors), yet significant variation was observed in number of independent directors in audit committees of our sample firms which varied from having just one independent director for a sample firm to a maximum of six independent directors in other firms. In view of above, effectiveness of audit committee is measured in terms of total number of independent members in the audit committee of the firm rather than as proportion independent directors in audit committee Profitability It represents profitability of the firm is measured by its PAT as the percentage of its total revenues Industry It represents industry of the firm and is a categorical variable represented by ∑I. As per BSE's industry classification, sample firms of this study belonged to 19 different industries. Therefore, 19 dummy variables are created and ∑I is the summation of all these dummy variables Age It represents age of a firm and is measured by number of years of its existence since its incorporation 6 Results and analysis
Results pertaining to construction of VCGP index and measurement of VCGP scores
A 55-item VCGP index shown in Table 3 is prepared by using methodology explained in section 5.1. The 55 disclosure items or sub-codes in VCGP index are grouped under six major codes. Each of the six major codes has several sub-code items under it. The procedure followed to arrive at the multi-level rating scales for each the 55 subcodes depicted that only 12 sub-codes showed a high level of variation in their disclosure intensity (quality) across sample firms (Table 3) . Remaining 43 sub-codes (about 78% items of VCGP index) showed negligible variation in their disclosure intensity across sample firms. Thus, multi-level rating scales were developed only for the 12 sub-codes. For remaining 43 sub-codes, a dichotomous scale was used where a score '1' was assigned to depict their presence in the annual reports of the sample firms and '0' was assigned otherwise.
The VCGP scores (with and without ratings) for all the 160 sample firms were obtained by using two distinct approaches explained in the methodology section.
6 While the VCGP score (with rating) of various sample firms varied from lowest of 1 to highest of 49, the VCGP score (without rating) varied from lowest of 1 to highest of just 35. Table 4 depicts results of Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test applied to test whether there was a significant difference in ranking of sample firms based on their VCGP scores with rating (R2) and without rating (R1). It can be inferred from the test results that there was not a significant difference in ranking of sample firms with ratings and without ratings. Keeping in view the preceding inference, it was felt that there is no need of running two separate analysis i.e., one with 'VCGP scores with rating' and other with 'VCGP scores without rating'. Therefore, the hereafter entire analysis in this study is done only with respect to 'VCGP scores with rating' of sample firms.
Reliability of VCGP index and the scoring procedure was assessed by using intercoder and test-retest techniques. Both authors separately coded randomly picked 20 of the sample annual reports and an inter-coder agreement of 0.97 was achieved in the scoring. Additionally, lead author after a lag of four months re-coded same randomly picked 20 annual reports from the sample. The VCGP scores obtained by firms in the second round exactly matched with the results of the first round. Above results of reliability tests depicted the stability of interpretation of VCGP index and scoring procedure across different researchers and over time (Boyatzis, 1998) . 
Results pertaining to determinants of adoption and disclosure of VCGP
The results of univariate, bivariate and multivariate analyses are sequentially presented below: Tables 5 and 6 report descriptive statistics of all the variables employed in this study. A large variation observed in 'Board Structure and Functioning' and 'Transparency and Communication' implied that voluntary CG practices (sub-codes) subsumed in these two major codes diverged across sample firms. However, a little variation observed in the 'Independence of Board Committees' implied that most of the sample firms had at least three Independent Directors in their various board level committees (Table 5) . Rank with ratings = Rank without ratings. Table 6 depicts that following firm-specific variables exhibit large variances: Board Independence (variance value of '117'), Ownership Concentration with (variance value '392'), Profitability (variance value of '192)', and Age (variance value of '559'). The minimum percentage of independent directors in the firms' boards is '12.50%' and the maximum percentage of independent directors in the firms' boards is as large as '80%'. On an average, Indian firms maintain the ratio of about 52% of independent directors in their boards. Similarly, ownership concentration of firms varies from '0%' to maximum '99%' means which means ownership pattern varied from being fully diversified firms to almost fully owned firms. The firms which have more than 80% of ownership concentration are mostly the public-sector firms. The profitability values of firms also vary from '-37.9%' to '83.8%' with an average value of 12.8% which is quite low for the year 2011-2012. The sample contains both types of firms, very young firm about '5' years and very old firms about '115' years old. The average age of the firm in the sample is about '39' years. Not much variation is observed in other independent variables of the sample firms. 
Univariate analyses

Multivariate analyses
Before proceeding to multivariate analysis it was necessary to check the multicollinearity among independent variables. The value of variation inflation factor (VIF) for all the independent variables was found between '1' to '2'. Therefore, multicollinearity was not an issue. As discussed in the methodology section, both MCL regression model and Poisson regression model were estimated to ascertain the combined effect of all the independent variables on the dependent variable. Table 7 reports and compares the test results of both the models viz. MCL regression model and the Poisson regression model which are obtained with the help of SPSS software. By looking at the goodness of fit statistics of the Poisson regression model (viz., value/df statistics of both deviance and Pearson chi square is greater than 1), it can be inferred that fitting an over-dispersed model may be reasonable. Omnibus test further confirms the significance of the overall fitted model for both the models with alpha values of '0.00' as compared to the null models. But by looking at the Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for both the models, Poisson Regression Model seems to be a more appropriate model as these values are smaller for Poisson regression model as compared to MCL model. By looking at the Test of Model Effects statistics it can be inferred that the Independent Variables 'Industry', 'Auditor type', 'Listing Status of the firm', 'Leverage', 'Effectiveness of Audit Committee' and 'Size' significantly affect the firms' VCGP disclosures for both the models at 5% significance level. Additionally, the Independent Variable 'Ownership Concentration' found significant in Poisson Regression Model at 10% significance level. Table 7 Multivariate analysis results Table 8 displays the parameter estimates of all independent variables which are found significant for Poisson regression model (Model-2). For the variables 'Size' and 'Effectiveness of audit committee' positive β-values suggest that larger firms tend to adopt and disclose more Voluntary CG practices as suggested by the agency theory. Similarly, the firms which have more number of independent directors in their audit committees also adopt and disclose more voluntary CG practices. On the other hand, the β-values for the independent variable 'leverage' and 'Ownership Concentration' are negative. Table 8 Parameter estimates The negative β-values for the variable 'Financial Leverage' indicated that less levered Indian firms tend to adopt and disclose more of VCGP. This result was counter-intuitive. Therefore, a further literature review was done to understand the reasons for above counter-intuitive result. This review led authors to follow two alternative theoretical explanations:
Goodness of fit
• Substitution theory: According to the substitution theory, corporate governance mechanisms are alternative ways to solve agency problems of business entities and firms tend to optimise their governance cost by substituting one mechanism for another. If agency problems cannot be fully solved by firm's existing mechanisms, only then it relies on alternate mechanisms to further alleviate its agency problems. A firm chooses a given governance mechanism only to compensate for the ineffectiveness/weakness of its other mechanisms (Boyd, 1994; Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Dalton et al., 2003; Singh and Davidson, 2003; Rutherford et al., 2007) . As per substitution theory firms' financial leverage acts as a strong external governance mechanism which can be viewed as a substitute for its other internal CG mechanisms. It acts as a selfdisciplining mechanism for managers by reducing discretionary funds available to them and also by subjecting them to the scrutiny of the financial markets (Jensen, 1986) . A higher debt ratio implies a larger amount of interests and principals to be paid periodically, and the management would be under pressure to ensure enough cash flow to cover the debt payment, which can be done through more efficient management (Grossman and Hart, 1982) . Thus, the need of strengthening of internal governance of firms gets substituted by strong external governance provided by debt providers in highly levered firms. Similarly, researchers have pointed to the substitution effect of 'ownership concentration' (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . They asserted that concentrated ownership also helps in mitigating agency issues. Thus, high level of ownership concentration can substitute for alternate CG mechanisms.
• Interaction between financial leverage and ownership concentration: Bruslerie and Latrous (2007) in their review of literature argue that the role of debt in corporate governance depends on the structure of corporate ownership and control. Indeed, debt can play two contrasting roles with regard to corporate governance. On the one hand, in widely held firms with traditional mangers-shareholders conflict, debt is seen as a disciplinary device limiting managerial opportunism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986) . Debt payments limit the managerial discretion by reducing the amount of free cash flow that could otherwise be used in unprofitable projects. On the other hand, in firms dominated by controlling shareholders, debt is used to enhance the voting power of controlling shareholders and to further expropriate outside shareholders. This prompted authors to test the possibility that at different levels of promoters' ownership, financial leverage may have a different effect on adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices by firms.
A revised Poisson Model was run to check the possibility of interaction effect between 'financial leverage' and levels of 'ownership concentration'. To assess the above interaction effect, the continuous independent variable 'ownership concentration' whose value varied from 0% to 99%, was converted into a categorical variable 'Own_Conc_Cat' with following three distinct categories:
• Category 1 firms had highly diversified shareholding with ownership concentration up to 33%
• Category 2 firms were moderately diversified with ownership concentration varying from 34% to 66%
• Category 3 firms had highly concentrated shareholding with ownership concentration varying from 67% to 99%.
The revised model included:
• only those variables which were found significant in the estimation of models 1 and 2
• categorical variable 'Own_Conc_Cat' was included in lieu of continuous variable 'Own_Conc' of models 1 and 2
• an additional variable 'Own_Conc_Cat*Leverage' to capture interaction effect between 'financial leverage' and levels of 'ownership concentration'. Table 9 reports the results of estimation of Poisson regression model (Model-3). The Log Likelihood value of the revised model is lesser negative as compared to the previous Poisson regression model suggesting the later model to be an improved one. Both variables 'Own_Conc_Cat' and 'Own_Conc_Cat*leverage' were found to be significant. While moving from category 1 to category 2 of the variable Own_Conc_Cat, β-value changes from '0' to positive and exp(β) value changes from '1' to '1.13'. This implies that firms with moderately diversified shareholding adopt and disclose 13% more voluntary CG practices compared to firms with highly diversified shareholding. Similarly, β-value changes from '0'to negative and exp(β) value changes from '1' to '0.90' when one moves from category 1 to category 3 of the variable Own_Conc_Cat. This implies that firms with highly concentrated shareholding adopt and disclose 10% lesser voluntary CG practices as compared to firms with highly diversified shareholding. '. This shows that at the highest level of ownership concentration substitution effect of leverage on the level of VCGP disclosures of the firm is reduced from 5.2% to 4.1% or (1.011-1-0.052). This may be due to the strong substitution effect of ownership concentration observed in this stratum.
Thus, to conclude, following interaction (interplay) between 'Leverage' and 'Ownership Concentration' is observed. While firms with high and moderately diversified shareholding pattern depict substitution effect of leverage on adoption of VCGP, firms with highly concentrated shareholding pattern depict substitution effect of ownership concentration on adoption of VCGP.
Table 9
Poisson regression with interaction effect (Model-3) Table 9 Poisson regression with interaction effect ( 
Goodness of fit
Conclusions, implications and limitations
The research questions of this study are:
• Whether a wide-variation in adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices across Indian listed firms still persists?
A two-stage analysis is carried out to arrive at answers for the above research questions.
In the first stage, a 55-item VCGP index is developed and a through content analysis of disclosed voluntary CG practices in the annual reports of each of the 160 sample Indian listed firms is done to arrive at the VCGP score of each of the sample firms. This analysis revealed that there exists a large variation in the voluntary CG practices of Indian listed firms. While some firms have adopted and disclosed exemplary voluntary CG practices, other firms adopt and disclose very little voluntary CG practices.
In the second stage, initially, two alternate regression models were specified and estimated to ascertain the determinants of adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices of Indian listed firms. In these regression models, VCGP scores of sample firms are regressed against firm-specific characteristics viz., size, financial leverage, the extent of intangibility of assets, listing status, board independence, ownership concentration, auditor type, audit committee effectiveness, profitability, industry type, age, investment opportunities, need for external financing. The results of above regression analyses revealed that the VCGP disclosures of Indian listed firms are affected significantly positively by: their size, the effectiveness of their audit committees, being foreign listed and anyone of the Big4 auditors as their external auditor. On the other hand, 'Leverage' and 'Ownership Concentration' had an overall significant negative impact on the VCGP disclosures of Indian listed firms which pointed to the possibility of substitution effect of these two variables. The later regression analysis (model 3) confirmed the
• substitution effect of 'Leverage' and 'Ownership Concentration' on adoption and disclosures of VCGP
• presence of interaction (interplay) between 'Leverage' and 'Ownership Concentration'.
While firms with high and moderately diversified shareholding pattern depict substitution effect of leverage on adoption of VCGP, firms with highly concentrated shareholding pattern depict substitution effect of ownership concentration on adoption of VCGP. Finally, the fact that variable 'industry' was found significant in all three models means that voluntary CG practices of Indian listed firms varied across different industries. This study has made several significant contributions to the literature of CG. First, this study has constructed a contemporary and comprehensive 55-item VCGP index designed exclusively to measure the extent of voluntary CG practices of the Indian listed firms. Unlike the composite focus of existing indices, this study has chosen to focus only on voluntary CG practices. Second, this study wherever applicable has developed and applied appropriate rating scales rather than only using dichotomous scale (1 or 0) for measurement of VCGP scores of its sample firms through use of VCGP index. Most existing studies have used dichotomous scale (1 or 0) for measurement of CG scores of their sample firms. Third, this is the first ever study which has investigated the determinants of adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices of Indian listed firms. Fourth, this study, keeping in view that its dependent variable (VCGP scores) is a count variable, has suitably applied the MCL regression and the Poisson regression models to determine the factors influencing the Indian listed firms' decisions to disclose voluntary CG practices. Above models are likely to provide more accurate results compared to the application of OLS regression models by the most existing studies. Finally, study recorded the
While firms with high and moderately diversified shareholding pattern depicts substitution effect of leverage on adoption of VCGP, firms with highly concentrated shareholding pattern depicts substitution effect of ownership concentration on adoption of VCGP. This is in alignment with the substitution theory which asserts that firms tend to optimise their governance cost by substituting one governance mechanism with other. The findings of this study have several implications for managers, investors and policy makers. Indian firms should enhance their adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices and to do so they should benchmark their voluntary CG practices with proposed VCGP index of this study. Regulatory requirements in India regarding mandatory adoption and disclosure of CG practices can be reviewed to make such voluntary CG practices mandatory which are found to be rarely adopted and disclosed by the sample firms of this study. Current and prospective investors can decide on their investments decisions depending on disclosed VCGP being made by firms. Similarly, current and prospective employees of Indian firms should incorporate the findings of this study to be in employment of best-governed firms. The determinants of VCGP can be used by the investors to identify the other Indian firms (not in the study sample) which potentially are following and disclosing more voluntary CG practices.
Despite the above suggested practical implications, this study has several limitations. This study follows a cross-sectional design. A longitudinal study would have the potential to determine any pattern of changes in the extent of adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices over time. The study assumes that the annual reports are the primary documents available to stakeholders requiring information on the firms. However, firms now use multitude mediums to make their disclosures. Therefore, in future, researchers can carry out studies wherein determinants and impact of voluntary disclosures made through media reports, press conferences, etc. should be studied. This study has focused on determinants of adoption and disclosure of voluntary CG practices. In future, similar comprehensive studies on other less studied voluntary practices can also be done.
